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Introduction
With only a few exceptions, the literature on group contests 1 has focused attention on impact functions 2 that are additively separable in the effort levels of its members. Additive separability of individual efforts is an important starting point for the analysis of group contests. However, it is clear that efforts of different group members are incomplete substitutes in a number of examples. In R&D races, where teams of researchers develop new technologies, the whole project is often divided into different, more or less complementary sub-projects that are carried out by different researchers. In military conflicts the armed forces are highly specialized and often divided into complementary units. The same is true for the standard lobbying case if representatives of different firms or organizations lobbying for the same policy differ in qualifications and specialize accordingly. In sports contests, team members are usually specialized with respect to qualifications that complement each other in a non-additive way. This list of examples could be arbitrarily extended because the mere idea of specialization implies that there is a certain degree of complementarity in team or group production. Individuals differ in talents, qualifications, and affections such that we can expect that individuals in a group or team will specialize to increase overall productivity. We can expect a certain degree of complementarity between the efforts of the group members. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) principle with separable additive production. However [...] there is a source of gain from cooperative activity involving working as a team, wherein individual cooperating inputs do not yield identifiable, separate products which can be summed to measure the total output."
1 The literature on contests between groups has recently been surveyed by Corchón, 2007 , Section 4.2, Garfinkel & Skaperdas, 2007 , Section 7, and Konrad, 2009 2 The term is defined and discussed in Münster (2009) .
If non-additive effort is the rule rather than the exception, it is important to understand how the degree of substitution between individual efforts influences behavior in and the outcome of the contest. In this paper we analyze a situation where efforts of group members can be imperfect substitutes. In order to capture this idea, we assume that individual efforts x k i are mapped onto group output (which itself is the input in the contest success function) by means of a CES-impact function,
1/γ , with variable elasticity of substitution 1/(1 − γ), ranging from perfect complements (γ → −∞) to perfect substitutes (γ → 1). The contest is of the Tullock type, and the rent is a group-specific public good (i.e. nonrival in consumption).
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If groups instead of individuals compete in a contest, the well-known free-rider problem among group members exists. Every individual bears the full costs of its investments, whereas the benefits partly spill over to the rest of the group (Katz, Nitzan, & Rosenberg, 1990; Esteban & Ray, 2001; Epstein & Mealem, 2009; Nitzan & Ueda, 2009) . Depending on the sharing rule applied, this problem may also exist for a private good (Nitzan, 1991a (Nitzan, , 1991b Esteban & Ray, 2001; Nitzan & Ueda, 2009 ). In the recent literature, Baik (2008) , Epstein and Mealem (2009), and Lee (2008) have presented contest models with group-specific public goods. A major result in Baik (2008) is that in a model with linear effort costs and additively linear impact functions only those group members with the highest valuation of the rent make positive investments in the contest. In his model, efforts of group members are perfect substitutes and therefore the optimality conditions given by the first-order conditions cannot hold for different valuations. With several group members having the maximal valuation among the group, there exist multiple equilibria, since the first order condition only defines the total effort spent by the group. Epstein and Mealem (2009) stick to the assumption of additive separability of individual effort in the group-production functions but introduce decreasing returns to investment.
Using a technology that fulfills standard Inada conditions they show that every individual makes positive investments. Their model is isomorphic to a model with linear impact functions and in which individuals face strictly convex costs. In this sense, effort levels are no longer perfect substitutes, but the impact function is still additively separable. Lee (2008) focuses attention on weakest-link impact functions.
The perfect complementarity of efforts creates a coordination problem between group members which gives rise to multiple equilibria, and the equilibrium with highest 3 Münster (2009) provides an axiomatic foundation for the Tullock function for group contests.
efforts is determined by the valuation of the player with minimum valuation within each group. Hence, the models of Baik (2008) and Lee (2008) represent the "polar"
cases with respect to the elasticity of substitution between group members.
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Our model generalizes these results. It turns out that the equilibrium of our model is unique for all values of γ ∈ {(−∞, 0), (0, 1)} (γ = 0 can only be covered by a limit result). If there is no within-group heterogeneity with respect to valuations of the prize and all groups have the same size, the equilibrium is independent of the elasticity of substitution. This result is a useful starting point because it shows that the elasticity of substitution per se has no impact on behavior in the contest:
contrary to the cursory idea that increasing the degree of complementarity between group-members' efforts helps to internalize the existing free-rider problem.
5 At the same time, this result shows that the standard results on group contests are robust with respect to variations in the elasticity of substitution under these assumptions.
An immediate implication of this irrelevance result is the conjecture that the elasticity of substitution becomes relevant if there is heterogeneity between group members with respect to the valuations of the rent and/or heterogeneity between groups with respect to group size, if at all.
A first important result of this general case is the characterization of active and inactive groups. We know from Hillman and Riley (1987) and Stein (2002) (for contests between individuals) that players may prefer not to participate in a contest if valuations are sufficiently heterogenous. This result carries over to the case of group contests. However, if a group is active, every member of this group exerts positive effort. In addition, the equilibrium strategies are continuous (but not necessarily continuously differentiable) in the elasticity of substitution everywhere except at γ = 0, because groups that become inactive or active do this in a "smooth"
way.
The limit behavior of our model is of particular interest. First, the results for the two limiting cases γ → 1 and γ → −∞ have been analyzed by Baik (1993 Baik ( , 2008 and Lee (2008) . In the former case, equilibrium effort is determined by the players with 4 One might argue that the best-shot technology where only the maximum effort counts is even more extreme, but it is relatively obvious that as for the case of perfect substitutes the equilibrium with maximum effort is also determined by the players with maximum valuations.
the maximum valuations, and in the latter case by the players with the minimum valuation in each group, which implies that group size does not matter. However, there are multiple equilibria in both cases. We can show that our model is consistent with both results in the sense that the equilibrium converges to one of the equilibria of the boundary cases. As a consequence, the uniqueness of the equilibrium for all values of γ except 1 and −∞ shows that the multiplicity problems are not robust with respect to small changes in the elasticity of substitution.
For all other values of γ, relative group size is important for the resulting equilibrium. This observation allows it to build a bridge to the discussion about the so-called "group-size paradox" (Olson, 1965; Esteban & Ray, 2001; Nitzan & Ueda, 2009 ) that "larger groups may be less successful than smaller groups in furthering their interests" (Esteban & Ray, 2001, p.663) . We can show that the possible reversal of the group-size paradox occurs also in our model if γ ∈ (0, 1). In the limiting case γ = 1, group size is irrelevant, and a reduction in the elasticity of substitution helps the relatively large groups at the expense of the relatively small ones. In the limit case γ → 0 + only the largest groups stay active, and if there is a single largest group, it wins almost for sure, irrespective of its relative valuation of the rent. This finding shows that the reversal of the group-size paradox is not restricted to sufficiently convex cost functions (Esteban & Ray, 2001) . A decrease in the elasticity of substitution has the same effect.
The fact that we have covered all possible elasticities of substitution allows it to incorporate the discussion about the relative advantage of large or small groups into a larger picture. For higher degrees of complementarity (γ < 0), we can show that the advantage of larger groups is reversed as soon as γ turns negative. As γ approaches 0 from below, large groups become inactive, and in the limiting case we end up with an arbitrarily large advantage of the smallest group. This discontinuity of the model at γ = 0 is a consequence of the CES-impact function that increasingly leverages differences in group size as γ approaches 0. However, smaller values of γ tend to help larger groups also if γ < 0. Hence, if deviations from the perfect-substitutes case are the rule rather than the exception for most empirical applications, there is no immediate answer to the question of whether large or small groups have an advantage in the contest. It depends on the strength of the complementarities. Coming back to the discussion about free-riding and the degree of complementarity, the results on relative group size show that in fact more complementary impact functions ceteris paribus help larger groups at the expense of smaller ones, and in this sense it helps alleviating the free-rider problem that is more severe the larger the relative size of the group.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce the model in Section 2 and start with introductory examples in Section 3. We characterize the simultaneous Nash equilibrium of the general model in Section 4. In subsection 4.1 we will state convergence results for γ approaching 1, 0, and −∞, and in subsection 4.2 the comparative-static results are summarized. Section 5 concludes.
The model
Assume that n groups compete for a given rent R. m i is the number of individuals in group i and k is the index of a generic member of this group. The rent is a group-specific public good that has a value v k i > 0 to individual k of group i, and we assume the following ordering:
. p i represents the probability of group i = 1, ..., n to win the contest. It is a function of some vector of aggregate group output q 1 , ..., q n . We focus on Tullock-form contest success functions where the winning probability of a group i is defined as:
The aggregate group output depends on individual effort
Following the literature we will call q i (.) impact functions in the following and make the assumption that they are of the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) type.
Note that we obtain a closed-form solution only if γ = 0. The Cobb-Douglas case γ → 0 will be covered by a limit result.
Assumption 3: Individuals are risk neutral, face linear costs, and maximize their net rent.
It follows from Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 that the individual utility functions are as follows: 
where " * " refers to equilibrium values.
Introductory examples
The explanatory variable that is new compared to the existing literature is the elasticity of substitution. In this section we analyze three simple examples that provide intuition for the relevance of this variable in contests. We will come back to these examples throughout the main part of the paper to provide intuition for the general results. As we will see, the elasticity is only relevant if the valuations between members of the same group differ or if groups differ in size. The first-order condition that characterizes an interior solution to the individual optimization problems of a member k of group i is given by
which is a simple "marginal revenues equal marginal costs" condition. = v i , i = 1, 2. We assume that all members of a given group behave identically.
Using this fact, it follows that
, and (3) can be simplified to yield
It follows that x 1 v 2 = v 1 x 2 in an interior equilibrium, and finally
investments in the contest are independent of γ. This example shows that the elasticity of substitution does not play a role if there is no within-group heterogeneity and groups are of equal size. The reason for this result is the combination of a constant-return to scale impact function with a contest success function that is homogenous of degree zero. Conversely, it must be either within-group heterogeneity and/or differences in group size that may cause behavioral changes due to changes in γ. The next two examples show that this may in fact be the case.
Example 2: Second, we assume that v 1 = v 2 but allow for differences in group size.
In this case, (3) implies
if all members of the same group behave identically. In this case, individual efforts depend on the size of the groups. As we will discuss in greater detail in Section 4.2, this finding allows to perceive the discussion about the group-size paradox in a more general and comprehensive way.
Example 3: In the last example we assume that
for both groups. Again, (3) can be used to get the following symmetric equilibrium:
As in the second example, γ may influence the outcome of the game if differences among the valuations of the rent among the group members exist.
The general case
We now turn to the analysis of the general case. In order to have a lean notation,
in the following. While deriving the equilibrium strategies, we will omit the parameters of these functions for better readability (e.g y Hillman and Riley (1987) and Stein (2002) have shown that groups/individuals may prefer to stay inactive if the size of all groups is equal to 1. Baik (2008) has shown that only group members with maximum valuation participate in a contest. Hence, it is possible that some individuals and/or groups will stay inactive in our setup.
We therefore start with an analysis of active individuals and groups. Lemma 1: In a Nash equilibrium of a contest fulfilling Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 if a group participates, it fully participates.
The proof of this as well as the next Lemma can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 1 implies that in order to determine whether an individual participates, it is sufficient to determine whether its group participates. Let
Without loss of generality, suppose the groups are ordered such that
for a given γ. Q * i (γ) and Q * (γ) shall denote Q i and Q in equilibrium. The following Lemma determines the groups that participate in equilibrium.
Lemma 2: a) There exist best response strategies of the members of a group, if and only if the following group best response function is fulfilled:
b) Groups 1 . . . n * (γ) participate, where n
c) If the Nash equilibrium is unique, Q * i (γ) and Q * (γ) are continuous functions for
Lemma 2.c is useful for the comparative-static analysis. Given that the number and identity of active groups depends on γ, it is a priori not clear that aggregate effort and indirect utilities are continuous in γ. The Lemma reveals that continuity is in fact guaranteed except at γ = 0. The economic intuition is as follows: Assume thatγ is a point where a formerly active group becomes inactive or a formerly inactive group becomes active. The aggregate group effort of the active group is continuously reduced to zero as γ approachesγ, and the formerly inactive group continuously increases its effort from 0 as γ increases fromγ. Hence, there is a "smooth" fade out or fade in of groups at those points.
The following proposition characterizes the unique Nash equilibrium of the game.
For readability, the strategies x k i are defined as functions of Q * (γ) and V i (γ).
Proposition 1. The unique Nash equilibrium of the game characterized by Assumptions 1,2, and 3 is given by strategies x k i * (γ) that fulfill
where
and n * (γ) is defined in Lemma 2.a and groups are ordered such that
Proof. To obtain Q * (γ) we sum (7) over all i ≤ n * (γ):
With an explicit solution for Q * (γ), we can now determine individual expenditures x k i * (γ) by solving equation (7) using (9). The participation condition of a group is given by Lemma 2, while Lemma 1 ensures that there does not exist an incentive for any group member to deviate to x k i = 0. It was further shown that the first-order conditions return local maxima. Since the system of equations given by the firstorder conditions of the participating groups has a unique solution this is indeed the unique Nash equilibrium.
A focal special case has equal group size m i = m∀i and no intra-group hetero-
The following corollary of Proposition 1 can then be established. 
The corollary shows that the elasticity of substitution is only relevant if there is either heterogeneity with respect to valuations within groups and/or heterogeneity with respect to group size. In all other cases equilibrium behavior does not depend on γ. This finding implies that an increase in complementarity between group members' effort per se has no effect on the within-group free-rider problem, as could have been conjectured from Hirshleifer (1983) . A further implication of the result is that the results on group contests that have been derived in the literature for the case of perfect substitutes or perfect complements carry over to arbitrary elasticities of substitution if groups differ only in their valuations of the rent.
Convergence Results
Before we move on to the core convergence results with respect to γ and the comparative statics of the model, let us first note that the winning probability of group i takes the form:
which can be derived from (7). We will now state convergence results where γ approaches 1, 0, and −∞.
Proposition 2. For γ → 1, we get
Proof. It is straightforward to derive the following equation from (8):
For the limit it then holds:
Proposition 2 shows that for γ increasing towards one, the group members with lower valuations will decrease their efforts towards zero, and only the group members with the highest valuations contribute. If there is more than one individual with the highest valuation, we converge to an equilibrium where those individuals contribute equally.
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Next we will analyze the other boundary case when γ approaches −∞. In order to have a lean notation we denote lim γ→−∞ f (γ) by f (−∞) for all functions f (.):
Proposition 3. For γ → −∞, we obtain:
The results follow directly from the determination of the limit of (8).
Proposition 3 b) shows that (as expected given the results by Lee (2008) ) all group members participate with equal amounts. In this sense, for γ near −∞, we obtain similar results as for a min(. . . ) impact function. However, this function creates multiple equilibria with an associated equilibrium-selection problem. Given the uniqueness of equilibria for all finite γ, our limit result can be interpreted as an equilibrium-selection mechanism where individual contributions depend on the harmonic mean of the valuations.
Next we look at the limit behavior for γ → 0. It turns out that we have to consider γ → 0 + and γ → 0 − separately because the problem may not be continuous at this point.
Proposition 4. Suppose ∀i : m i ≥ m i+1 . For γ → 0 + , we obtain: a) If n * is either defined by m 1 = · · · = m n * > m n * +1 with n * ≥ 2, or by
a) If n * is either defined by m 1 = · · · = m n * < m n * +1 with n * ≥ 2, or by
The proofs to these two propositions can be found in the appendix. In part a) of each proposition the participating groups are defined. For γ → 0 + , only the largest, while for γ → 0 − , only the smallest groups participate in the contest (in both cases there always remain at least two groups). Unless there exist groups with equal sizes (which are maximal for the convergence from above, and minimal for the convergence from below), individual efforts always approach zero. Further, e) shows the winning probabilities of the groups: the largest (respectively smallest for convergence from below) groups have equal probabilities of winning, while any group smaller (larger)
has zero probability of winning in equilibrium, d) tells us that and Q * (γ) converges to infinity if γ converges from above and there is no group of size 1 which participates in the contest. These results show that the behavior around γ = 0 is crucially determined by the relative size of the groups. This property has a resemblance to the results on the so-called "group-size paradox", i.e. the apparent disadvantage of larger groups compared to smaller ones (Esteban & Ray, 2001; Olson, 1965) . To obtain a proper intuition for this resemblance it is helpful to return to Example 2.
Example 2 continued: Coming back to Example 2 from Section 3, (5) can be used to determine that the values of the impact functions are
which in turn can be used to determine the equilibrium winning probabilities:
It follows from Proposition 3 that the limit behavior of these probabilities is
and analogously for p 2 (m 1 , m 2 , γ). Figure 1 shows p 1 (m 1 , m 2 , γ) (dashed line) and p 2 (m 1 , m 2 , γ) (solid line) for the case m 1 > m 2 . We will focus on p 1 (m 1 , m 2 , γ) in the following. The graph starts at 0.5 at γ = 1. This is the well-known case where group size has no impact on the winning probability (Baik, 2008) . p 1 (m 1 , m 2 , γ) steadily rises to 1 as γ converges to 0. At this point it jumps to 0 and increases to 0.5 again as γ converges to −∞. In this case, group-size again does not matter because only the minimum contribution counts (Lee, 2008) . In order to understand the economic intuition for this result, it makes sense to highlight the similarity of our problem to the problem analyzed by Esteban and Ray (2001) . They found that the group-size paradox need not hold in a contest-environment and may be reversed to yield an advantage for large groups if the costs of effort are sufficiently convex.
This result has a counterpart in our model if γ ∈ (0, 1). Reducing γ in this interval increasingly improves the position of the larger group. In the limit, the larger group can win the contest with probability close to one as γ approaches zero. A reduction If we follow Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and see a certain degree of complementarity in effort as constitutive for a group problem, Proposition 3 and the above discussion have important implications for our perception of the relevance of relative group size. The discussion about the existence of a "small-group advantage"
or a "large-group advantage" crucially depends on the degree of complementarity between group-members efforts. Hence, we do not have any a priori reason to believe in the existence of such an advantage.
Comparative statics
We now turn to the comparative-static analysis of the influence of the elasticity of substitution on the behavior in the contest using the approach developed by Cornes and Hartley (2005) . Most interestingly, individual valuations in relation to the valuations of the other group members define the individuals' share of the amount of effort spent by the group, x k i * /X * i . The valuation of other groups have no effect on these shares. As was to be expected, a larger elasticity of substitution γ increases ceteris paribus the dispersion of these shares, since the exponent discriminates more 7 To eliminate this property, one could normalize the impact function such that q i (.
. This however leads to a function that no longer converges to the min(. . . ) function if γ → −∞, which we desire here. Such a normalized impact function may however be of interest elsewhere. strongly between differences in valuations. The next proposition states the effect of γ on the individual shares.
Proposition 6.
at a point where the participating groups remain the same.
Proof. Taking the derivative of (11) with respect to γ yields
The RHS of the above equation is positive whenever the term in brackets is positive.
Setting ln v
and rearranging yields the above condition.
The proposition implies that for all group members with a valuation above the weighted geometric mean, the share of total group effort increases with γ. The result shows that the dispersion of valuations plays a crucial role for the comparative-static effects of γ. To get a better intuition for this result we return to Example 3. Both, x min and x max converge to the same value that is determined by the harmonic mean of the valuations in the group. A reduction in the spread of valuations 
Proof. Taking the derivative of (9) with respect to γ where the participating groups remain the same yields:
Therefore, for a given set of participating groups, total effort is decreasing in γ unless
From Lemma 2 we know that total effort is a continuous function in γ if γ = 0, that a group that is becoming inactive for some γ fades out smoothly.
Total effort can thus be expressed as a continuous, piecewise strictly decreasing function, which is a strictly decreasing function as well. Note again that Q * (γ) may be discontinuous at γ = 0 and thus the results only hold below and above this discontinuity. This establishes part a) of the proposition.
Similarly, if all individuals within one group are identical (v k i = v i ) it follows for a given n * : Hence, its relative share of impact and thereby winning probability goes down. This property can be nicely seen in Figure 1 where the winning probability of the larger group is decreasing for all values of γ = 0. The figure and the above analysis also
show that this result has to be interpreted with caution because of the potential discontinuity of p i at γ = 0. The same logic carries over to the case of more than two groups. However, the relative standing of group i then depends on the weighted geometric mean of all group sizes, as established in part c) of the proposition.
This intuition is further confirmed by the fact that 
Concluding Remarks
This paper has started from the observation that group effort can in general not be additively decomposed into some sum (of functions) of individual efforts. The use of a CES-impact function has allowed to identify the main channels of influence of the elasticity of substitution on the behavior in and the outcome of contests. If groups are of equal size and homogenous (i.e. all group members have the same valuation within the group), the elasticity of substitution does not matter. For heterogenous groups, the higher the complementarity of efforts, the lower the divergence of efforts among group members. As we have seen in Example 3, this does not necessarily lead to an advantage of the group with more diverse valuations. If all groups are homogenous but differ in size and valuations, we were able to state the effect of the elasticity of substitution on the winning probabilities of a group. Except for the discontinuity at the Cobb-Douglas case (γ = 0), higher complementarity tends to favor large groups. Near the discontinuity, small groups are at an advantage for γ < 0, while for γ > 0, large groups are at an advantage. In both cases, if there is a single largest (smallest) group, their advantage will become infinitely large leading to effort levels converging to zero. Near the cases of perfect complements and perfect substitutes, the equilibrium converges to special cases of the equilibria in Baik (2008) and Lee (2008) , respectively.
The results give a coherent picture about the role of heterogeneity of groups sizes and valuations between group members. However, it is clear that the the assumption of a linear homogenous impact function combined with the assumption of a contest success function that is homogenous of degree zero has greatly simplified the analysis.
We are nevertheless confident that our analysis provides some general insights into the relevance of the degree of complementarity of group members' efforts for their behavior in contests.
Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We first check that the interior solution is a local maximum. The first-order condition of the maximization problem (2) can be written as
The second-order condition is satisfied if
Solving the first-order condition for v k i and inserting the expression into the secondorder condition we obtain, upon rearranging:
which holds for all γ ∈ (−∞, 1). Therefore, all solutions of the first-order condition are local maxima taking the other players' strategies as given. The best responses are either given by the solution to the first-order condition, or by a corner solution. From equation (1) it is clear that the only possible corner solutions are non-participation with x k i = 0. We thus need to verify that whenever the best response of one member of the group is given by the solution to the first-order condition, it is not possible for any member of the group to have the best response x k i = 0. First, we will show that whenever there exists a solution of the first-order condition for one individual of a group, it exists for all individuals: From the first-order conditions of two representative group members l, k we obtain the within-group equilibrium condition: 
From the fact that there is an individual l in the group, which participates with strictly positive effort, we know that
Inserting (A.6) into (A.5) yields:
from which we obtain by inserting
which is a contradiction for all γ < 1. Thus there does not exist an equilibrium in which for one player in the group a corner solution at zero effort investments is obtained while for another an interior solution holds. 
We can now solve equation (A.1) for Y i explicitly:
Thus, the condition for a strictly interior solution is ( l v
this condition is the same for all members of a group. In all other cases, we get 
establishing part a), since by Lemma 1 either for all group members we obtain an interior solution or for none. Since the best-response function is continuous in γ = 0 and in the strategies of the other groups Q /i , if a unique Nash equilibrium exists, the equilibrium strategies must also be continuous in γ. This establishes part c) of Lemma 2. What remains to be shown is which groups participate in equilibrium.
Suppose a group ζ participates in equilibrium with strictly positive effort, while a group ζ + 1 does not participate. Let Q * i (γ) be Q i in equilibrium (we ignore here that these are best responses and should thus be functions of Q * /i ) and let the other variables introduced above be defined correspondingly in equilibrium. Then by the above condition in equilibrium we have for any given γ:
Since by assumption Q * ζ+1 (γ) = 0, we have Q * /ζ+1 (γ) = Q * (γ). Solving (7) for Q /i tells us that in an equilibrium where group ζ participates, the following needs to be true: in equilibrium. It follows that V ζ (γ) > V ζ+1 (γ). We can thus order the groups such that V i (γ) ≥ V i+1 (γ) and define n * (γ) as the group with the highest index number that still participates with strictly positive effort. By (B.6), all groups i ≤ n * (γ)
participate. This establishes part b) of Lemma 2.
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. We will make use of the following results: Note that by the first case all groups who do not have at least a group size equal to the second largest group will not participate for a sufficiently small γ. This is because for γ decreasing towards 0, iteratively all groups with minimal size will drop out of the contest. Thus, we have part a) of the proposition. For the case that there are n * − 1 participating groups of equal size strictly smaller than the largest group, their winning probability converges to zero (and thus for the largest group to one). For the case of n * equal groups with maximal size it approaches 1/n * . This establishes part e).
Suppose now we are at a γ small enough, such that only the groups with size 
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. The proof is in its structure almost identical to the one for Proposition 4 and will thus not be stated here. 
